We describe a novel logic, called HiLog, and show that it provides a more suitable basis for logic programming than does traditional predicate logic. HiLog has a higher-order syntax and allows arbitrary terms to appear in places where predicates, functions and atomic formulas occur in predicate calculus. But its semantics is rst-order and admits a sound and complete proof procedure. Applications of HiLog are discussed, including DCG grammars, higher-order and modular logic programming, and deductive databases.
Preface
Manipulating predicates, functions, and even atomic formulas is a commonplace in logic programming. For example, Prolog combines predicate calculus, higher-order and meta-level programming in one working system, allowing programmers routine use of generic predicate de nitions (e.g., transitive closure, sorting) where predicates can be passed as parameters and returned as values 7] . Another well-known useful feature is the \call" meta-predicate of Prolog. Applications of higher-order constructs in the database context have been pointed out in many works, including 24, 29, 41] .
Although predicate calculus provides the basis for Prolog, it does not have the wherewithal to support any of these features, which consequently have an ad hoc status in logic programming. In this paper, we investigate the fundamental principles underlying higher-order logic programming and, in particular, shed new light on why and how these Prolog features appear to work in practice. We propose a novel logic, called HiLog, which provides a clean declarative semantics to much of this higher-order logic programming.
From the outset, even the terminology of \higher-orderness" seems ill-de ned. A number of works have proposed various higher-order constructs in the logic framework 1, 5, 13, 7, 23, 24, 30, 31, 42, 45] but with such a diversity of syntax and semantics, it is not always clear what kind of higher-orderness is being claimed. In our opinion, there are at least two di erent facets to the issue: a higher-order This paper is an expanded version of the work previously reported in 10, 11] . syntax and a higher-order semantics. Logicians seem to have been long aware of this distinction and, for example, Enderton 16 , page 282] describes a translation of the syntactically second-order predicate calculus into a rst-order multi-sorted logic that admits a rst-order semantics.
Informally, by higher-order syntax, logicians mean a language in which variables are allowed to appear in places where normally predicate and/or function symbols do. In contrast, higher-order semantics is manifested by semantic structures in which variables may range over domains of relations and functions constructed out of the domains of individuals. In a rst-order semantics, variables can only range over domains of individuals or over the names of predicates and functions.
The third component in this picture is the equality theory that is built into the semantics of the logic. As explained below, an equality theory may bring the rst-order and higher-order semantics closer to each other. In the extreme case, this theory may imply a 1-1 correspondence between the domain of individuals and the domains of higher-order constructs. In this case, higher-order and rst-order semantics become virtually indistinguishable.
We note that the classi cation based upon semantics has no implication whatsoever regarding the \intrinsic higher-orderness," that is, whether there exists a sound and complete proof theory for a higher-order semantics. It is quite possible to replace a higher-order semantics for some languages by an entailment-equivalent rst-order semantics. On the other hand, it is well known that some semantics (e.g., the standard semantics of second-order predicate calculus) are inherently higher-order and no equivalent rst-order substitute exists for the corresponding languages.
Predicate calculus is the primary example of a logic where syntax and semantics are both rstorder. There are logics that have a higher-order syntax but a rst-order semantics. F-logic 24, 25] is one example; HiLog, to be discussed in this paper, also falls into this category. Examples of logics with higher-order syntax and semantics include COL 1] and Church's simple theory of types (under the standard and Henkin's semantics) 13, 23] . On the other hand, LDL 5, 46 ] is a language with a rst-order syntax and a higher-order semantics. Let us examine the equational theories underlying various logics more closely. Under a higher-order semantics, an equation between predicate (or function) symbols, e.g., p = q, is true if and only if these symbols are interpreted via the same relation (resp., function). Another way of saying this is that logics with a higher-order semantics have a built-in extensional equality theory of predicates and functions. In contrast, in HiLog and F-logic predicates and other higher-order syntactic objects are not equal unless they (i.e., their names) are equated explicitly. Thus, it is possible for two predicate symbols, say p and q, to be interpreted by the same relation and yet the equality p = q be false.
The above examples represent the two extreme cases, in a sense. There are higher-order languages with a rst-order semantics that embody a non-trivial equality theory. An example is a subset of Prolog 42, 45] that has no type variables and whose syntax is essentially the same as Church's simple theory of types 13] . Equality in Prolog corresponds to -equivalence and is not extensional: there may exist predicates that are not -equivalent but still extensionally equal.
To better see the role of equational theories on the classi cation of logical theories, note that there are two di erent aspects associated with an expression that denotes a predicate or a function. For instance, in -Prolog, one aspect is the meaning of the expression as a -term (or, more precisely, as an equivalence class of -terms), which we call the intension; the other aspect is the relation or a function associated with the expression, which we call the extension. These two aspects become indistinguishable if extensionality axioms are built into the logic. For instance, in Henkin's semantics of Church's type theory 23] , it makes no di erence whether predicate variables are considered to range over the domain of interpretation for predicate names (predicate intensions) or over relations (predicate extensions), since each extension now becomes associated with exactly one intension, and vice versa.
The distinction between intensions and extensions is important. It is known that extensions can be notoriously di cult to handle in an e cient manner. Separating intensions from extensions makes it possible to have an equational theory over predicate and function names that is separate from the extensional equality of relations and functions. A logic that avoids an overly strong equational theory of intensions, can have a simple rst-order semantics, a decidable uni cation problem and, at the same time, a higher-order syntax.
In a type-free logic, the same term may appear in di erent contexts as predicates or functions of di erent arities and even as atomic formulas. Thus the same intension can be associated with di erent extensions in di erent contexts. For instance, in the Lambda Calculus 40], a -term is considered a function or an object depending on its syntactic position. In HiLog, the same symbol may denote a predicate, a function, or an atomic formula. Semantics of a type-free logic has to maintain the distinctions between various extensions associated with the same intension. Since the same variable may appear in di erent contexts and have di erent extensions, it makes better sense for variables to range over intensions rather than extensions because only intensions remain the same across di erent contexts.
In this paper, we present a simple logical framework in which predicates, functions, and atomic formulas can be manipulated as rst-class entities. It is quite clear that in order to support such manipulation naturally enough, the syntax has to be higher-order. As explained earlier, this leaves open two possibilities for the semantics. Under higher-order semantics, predicates and functions are identi ed by their extensions, that is, two predicates represent the same thing if and only if their extensions coincide in every appropriate semantic structure. Unfortunately, extensional equality of predicates and functions is not decidable, in general, which carries over to the uni cation problem. For genuine second-order theories (e.g., second-order predicate calculus and Church's simple theory of types, both under the standard semantics) extensional equality is not even semi-decidable.
In contrast, under rst-order semantics, predicates and functions have intensions that can be manipulated directly. Furthermore, depending on the context, the same intension may assume di erent roles, acting as a relation, a function, or even a proposition. The logical consequence relation under a rst-order semantics is likely to be semi-decidable, unless a too strong equality theory destroys this property. This observation motivates our choice for HiLog. 1 The basic idea is to construct a logic that distinguishes between intensional and extensional aspects of the semantics and embodies only a trivial equality theory of intensions. Intensions can be thought of as names of abstract or concrete entities, while extensions correspond to various roles these entities play in the real world. It has also been argued by Maida and Shapiro 36, 37 ] that knowledge representation is part of the conceptual structure of cognitive agents, and therefore should not (and even cannot) contain extensions. The reason is that cognitive agents do not have direct access to the world, but only to one of its representations. Our approach is in the same spirit and, consequently, extensions of predicates and functions are not available for direct manipulation. On the other hand, intensions of higher-order entities such as predicates, functions, and even atomic formulas can be freely manipulated. Their extensions come into play only when the respective expressions need be evaluated. Thus, HiLog combines advantages of higher-order syntax with the simplicity of rst-order semantics, bene ting from both.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief motivational discussion, we formally present the syntax and semantics of HiLog. Then we give several examples of applying HiLog to higherorder logic programming, DCG grammars, and modular logic programming. After that, we discuss the relationship of HiLog to predicate calculus; its relationship to some of the recently proposed database languages is discussed in Section 5. A resolution-based proof theory of HiLog is described in Section 6.
Syntax and Semantics of HiLog

Motivation
Prolog syntax is quite exible; it allows symbols to assume di erent roles depending upon their context (e.g., to have di erent arities, or to be viewed as a constant, a function, or a predicate). For instance, in the clause
the symbol f occurs both as a unary and as a binary function, and p appears as a binary predicate as well as a binary function symbol. Furthermore, the same syntactic object, p(X, f(a)), is an atomic formula in the rst literal of the clause-body and an individual term in the second.
The support for multiple roles for non-logical parameters (constants, functions, and predicates) is a handy feature of Prolog but, unfortunately, this support is provided in a rather ad hoc way. For instance, while in the above example di erent occurrences of the same symbol can be semantically disambiguated simply by renaming the occurrences of f and p, this cannot be done in the following rule:
Here, the individual variable X occurs as a rst-order term and as an atomic formula, and renaming its di erent occurrences will, intuitively, yield a semantically di erent statement. HiLog supports multiple roles for parameter symbols in a much more general and elegant manner. Parameters are arityless and the distinction between predicate, function, and constant symbols is eliminated. In particular, a HiLog term can be constructed from any logical symbol followed by any nite number of arguments. Di erent occurrences of the same parameter are related to the same object characterized by the same intension. Associated with such an intension are several di erent extensions that capture the di erent roles the symbol may assume in di erent contexts.
The same view is extended to arbitrary terms. HiLog allows complex terms (not just parameter symbols) to be viewed as functions, predicates and atomic formulas. For example, a generic transitive closure predicate can be de ned as follows:
Here, closure is (syntactically) a second-order function which, given any relation R, returns its transitive closure closure(R). Generic de nitions can be used in various ways. For instance, parent(john, bill). parent(bill, bob). manager(john, mary). manager(mary, kathy). relation(parent). relation(manager). reports to(Person)(Superior) relation(Relname), closure(Relname)(Person,Superior).
will return f bill, mary, bob, kathy g in response to the query ?-reports to(john)(X), which is the set of john's ancestors and bosses. Often various applications of Prolog require term traversal. In HiLog, binary terms can be traversed as follows:
Notice that X is a variable that ranges over functors of the language, and therefore this program is independent of the alphabet of that language. In contrast, in Prolog one would have to either specify such a rule for every functor in the alphabet of the program, e.g.,
or use a built-in predicate arg/3, as in traverse(Tree) arg(1, Tree, Left), arg(2, Tree, Right), traverse(Left), traverse(Right).
In the latter, the structure of Tree is less visible and even is not enforced (unless we add another subgoal for checking the total number of arguments). In databases, schema browsing is common 41]. In HiLog, browsing can be performed through the same query language as the one used for data retrieval. For instance,
will return the names of all binary predicates whose extensions (under Herbrand interpretations) contain one or more tuples with the token john. HiLog shares this browsing capability with another recently proposed language, called F-logic 24, 25] .
The ability to use sets is very important in logic programming. Prolog supports the use of sets by means of the setof construct, which has only an operational semantics. Although newer logic languages, such as LDL 5, 46] or COL 1], do provide semantics for sets, they have to severely restrict their use to avoid logical paradoxes and/or computational intractability. In HiLog, sets can be represented naturally by parameterized predicates mentioned earlier. For instance, the following HiLog rule de nes groups of satis ed employees working for each manager. An employee is satis ed with the job if and only if he earns more than his boss: sat empl(Boss)(Empl) supervises(Boss, Empl), salary(Boss,B sal), salary(Empl, E sal), E sal > B sal.
The set-term, sat empl(Boss) is akin to the setof and the grouping constructs of Prolog and LDL, respectively, although HiLog sets are not constructed or used the same way. Having de ned sets intensionally, via terms, we can go on and use these sets in other relationships, as in the following fragment that associates packages of bene ts with groups of satis ed employees: package1(health ins). package1(life ins). package2(free car). package2(long vacations). bene ts( package1, sat empl(john) ). bene ts( package2, sat empl(bob) ). The following is a query regarding bene t packages that bob enjoys as an employee in the above enterprise:
?-bene ts(X,Y), Y(bob). Note that the above information about sets can be also encoded in Prolog, but less naturally. A more detailed discussion of these issues appears in Sections 4, 5, and 8.
As seen from the earlier examples, HiLog terms are also atomic formulas. In this capacity, their semantics is indirectly captured by the truth value assigned to each ground term. For instance, instead of saying that a pair < a; b > is in the relation for a predicate p, we say that the term p(a; b) denotes a true proposition. Formal details are provided in the next two subsections.
Language
In addition to parentheses, connectives, and quanti ers, the alphabet of a language L of HiLog contains a countably in nite set V of variables and a countable set S of parameter symbols. We assume that V and S are disjoint.
The set T of HiLog terms of L is a minimal set of strings over the alphabet satisfying the following conditions:
V S T ; If t; t 1 ; : : :; t n are in T , then t(t 1 ; : : :; t n ) 2 T , where n 1.
Notice that according to this de nition, a term can be applied to any nite number of terms and parameter symbols are arityless. An atomic formula is a term. More complex formulas are built from atomic formulas in the usual way, by means of connectives _,^(also written as &), :, and quanti ers 9 and 8.
In addition, we use and to denote the implication, where ( ) ( ) ( _ : ).
Likewise, ! and will stand for : _ . The bi-directional implication, \ $ ", also has the standard de nition.
A literal is either an atomic formula, a positive literal, or the negation :A of an atomic formula A, a negative literal. A clause is of the form 8X 1 :::8X k (L 1 _ ::: _ L n ), where L 1 ; :::; L n are literals and X 1 ; :::; X k are all the variables occurring in L 1 ; :::; L n . It is usually written simply as L 1 _ ::: _ L n . When n = 0, a clause is called the empty clause. A Horn clause is a clause that contains at most one positive literal. A de nite clause is a Horn clause of the form A _ :B 1 _ ::: _ :B n , where A; B 1 ; :::; B n are atomic formulas; de nite clauses are usually written as A B 1 ; :::; B n , where A is the head and the conjunction B 1 ; :::; B n is the body of the clause. 2 A negative clause is a clause containing no positive literals. A goal is a conjunction of literals, and a query is the negation of a goal, which can be written as a negative clause. For practical applications, we consider de nite logic programs that consist of a nite number of de nite clauses. Section 4.1 brie y deals with logic programs with negation. 2 As usual in logic programming literature, we use \," to denote conjunction of literals in the clause body.
Semantic Structures
Since|at the rst glance|the semantics of HiLog may seem a bit unusual, we precede the formal description by an informal discussion that shows how the semantics of the rst-order predicate calculus has evolved to support higher-orderness of HiLog. First, we de ne the Herbrand semantics because it is especially close to the Herbrand semantics of predicate calculus.
The Herbrand universe for a HiLog language, L, is the set of all ground (i.e., variable-free) HiLog terms in T . Since, terms in HiLog are also atomic formulas, it follows that Herbrand universe is identical to Herbrand base (cf. 35] ). This is not a coincidence: if we want to manipulate atomic formulas as terms, the former must be elements of the universe. Now, a Herbrand interpretation is simply a subset of the Herbrand base ( universe), the de nition of Herbrand interpretation commonly used in logic programming 35]. The de nition of formula satisfaction in such interpretations simply repeats the corresponding de nition in 35] .
Although Herbrand interpretations su ce for many of the needs of logic programming, there are at least two important reasons to be interested in a more general notion of semantic structure 16]: programs with equality and the semantics of negation by failure.
Recall that, in rst-order predicate calculus, a semantic structure M for a language L is a pair < U; I >, where U is called the domain of M and I is a function that interprets parameters of L (i.e., constants, function symbols, and predicate symbols). I consists of two di erent mappings, F and P. The former, F, interprets each k-ary (k 0) function symbol of L by a function U k 7 ?! U; the mapping P maps each n-ary predicate symbol to an n-ary relation over U. We consider constants as 0-ary function symbols, so F takes care of constants as well. In what follows, whenever f is a function symbol, I(f) will stand for F(f); when p is a predicate name, I(p) will stand for P(p). Note that the set of function symbols and the set of predicate symbols are disjoint.
In HiLog, one of our original goals was to eliminate the syntactic distinction among constants, function symbols, and predicates, so one cannot tell a constant from a predicate or a function symbol. 3 Therefore, F and P must map each parameter symbol to all of the following: an element of U, a function over U, and a relation on U. Another of our goals was to make symbols arityless. So, each symbol must be mapped into an in nite tuple of functions and relations, one for each arity.
There is a subtlety, however. How should we interpret a formula like X(a), where X is a variable? In predicate calculus, such formulas are interpreted with respect to a variable assignment, which is a mapping : V 7 ?! U. However, (X) is an element of the semantic domain U, and in order to interpret X(a) with respect to we must associate relations with elements of U rather then parameters of L. Thus, the interpreting mappings F and P must associate functions and relations with every element in U, including I(s) for each s 2 S, not with the symbols in S.
Following the usual development in predicate calculus, we can extend a variable assignment recursively to the set T of all terms as follows:
(s) = I(s) for every parameter symbol in S; (t(t 1 ; :::; t n )) = F( (t))( (t 1 ); :::; (t n )). However, the truth of an atomic formula t(t 1 ; :::; t n ) can be determined either with respect to the n-ary relation that P associates with (t), that is, P( (t))( (t 1 ); :::; (t n )), or with respect to the 0-ary relation 3 This is not to say that we dismiss the utility of typing. To the contrary, we distinguish between well-formedness and typing, which we feel are orthogonal concepts. Our goal here is to relax the stringent well-formedness requirements of predicate calculus while preserving the ability to talk about type correctness. An attempt to introduce types into HiLog is described in 9].
(i.e., true or false) which it associates with (t(t 1 ; :::; t n )), that is, P( (t(t 1 ; :::; t n ))). Both alternatives seem reasonable, but the second one results in a more uniform treatment of HiLog terms. Furthermore, it turns out that under certain natural assumptions, these two choices lead to the same semantics.
It is easy to see now that adopting the second alternative obviates the need for P. Indeed, all we need is to classify elements of the domain U into the intensions of true and false propositions. A simple way to do this is by introducing a subset U true U that designates propositions that are true in M.
Coming back to Herbrand interpretations discussed at the beginning of this section, we see that|in the Herbrand case|U true is precisely that subset of the Herbrand base that determines the interpretation.
After this informal introduction, we are ready for the formal development. A semantic structure for We thus see that a HiLog term may represent an individual, a function, a predicate, or an atomic formula in di erent contexts. The intension of a term is its associated element in the universe U. Extensional aspects of terms are captured as follows. The extensional aspect of a term viewed as a proposition is its truth value de ned by its membership in U true , while the extensional meaning of a term in its capacity as a function is captured by F. For example, if a term t appears as a k-ary function, e.g., in t(t 1 ; : : :; t k ), its extensional meaning under a variable assignment is the k-th projection of the vector of functions associated with the intension of t, that is, ( (t)) (k) F . On the other hand, the role of the above term as a proposition is indirectly captured through F and U true so that t(t 1 ; : : :; t k ) is true if and only if (t(t 1 ; :::; t k )) 2 U true .
Finally, the meaning of complex formulas is de ned in the standard way: Interpreted symbols, such as \=", \true", and \false", can be incorporated into HiLog by requiring interpretations to satisfy the following restrictions: I(true) 2 U true ; I(false) 6 2 U true ; I(=) Compared with other higher-order logics, such as Church's theory of types 13] and Prolog 42, 45] , HiLog treats only atomic formulas as rst-class objects. Formulas that contain connectives, such as \and", \or", or \not", could be built into HiLog by making these connectives into constants and requiring every semantic structure to satisfy the following conditions: I(and) (2) Alternatively, the above connectives can be de ned using HiLog clauses, e.g., and(X,Y) :-X,Y. Encoding formulas with quanti ed variables would require introduction of -abstraction into HiLog, which can be also done, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
Relationship to Prolog and Predicate Calculus
In this section, we show from various perspectives that HiLog is, in a well-de ned sense, a faithful extension of predicate calculus. In the sequel, we will use \PC" as an abbreviation for \predicate calculus." First, we compare HiLog to what we call contextual predicate calculus. This is an extension of ordinary, \pure" predicate calculus and is inspired by the way Prolog permits the use of the same symbol in di erent contexts (e.g., as a predicate symbol or as a function symbol of di erent arities). Syntactically, formulas in contextual PC are also well-formed in HiLog and therefore there is a question of whether the validity problems for such formulas under the semantics of HiLog and contextual PC coincide. We show that this is not always the case, but under certain conditions the two validity problems do coincide. In the second subsection, we consider formulas in pure predicate calculus. Such formulas are also well-formed in contextual PC and therefore also in HiLog. We then establish that the validity problem in pure PC coincides with the same problem in HiLog for an even larger class of formulas than in the case of contextual PC. The third subsection shows that every HiLog formula can be encoded as a formula in pure PC.
Validity in Contextual Predicate Calculus and HiLog
In Prolog, the same symbol may appear in di erent contexts as a predicate, a constant, or a function symbol; the same symbol can even occur with di erent arities in di erent parts of the program. The exact role played by an occurrence of a symbol depends on the context in which this symbol occurs. Such Prolog programs are normally understood as formulas in predicate calculus in which di erent occurrences of the same symbol are replaced by di erent function or predicate symbols (whichever is appropriate) of suitable arities. This ad hoc use of parameter symbols in multiple roles motivates a simple extension of PC, which we call contextual predicate calculus.
A language L of contextual PC contains a set of parameter symbols, S, and a set of variables, V. A term is either a variable, a parameter symbol, or an expression of the form s(t 1 ; :::; t n ), where s 2 S, n > 0, and t 1 , ... , t n are terms. An atomic formula is any term other than a variable, and the rest of the de nitions are as usual.
Clearly, contextual PC is an extension of PC in the direction of HiLog, but is not as radical. It stops short of introducing a higher-order syntax (because s above is an element of S, not a variable). Every formula in contextual PC is also a formula in HiLog. On the other hand, X and X(a)(b) are well-formed formulas in HiLog but not in contextual PC. Similarly, every PC formula is also a formula in contextual PC, but not vice versa, e.g., s(s; s) is a formula in contextual PC but not in PC.
Semantics of contextual PC is also a middle ground between HiLog and pure PC. A semantic structure for a contextual PC language is a tuple M =< U; I F ; I P >. By reversing the above construction, for every semantic structure M 00 of the language L 00 of contextual PC, one can construct a PC structure M 0 for L 0 such that a PC formula in L 0 is true in M 00 if and only if it is true in M 0 . Thus, if is valid as a PC formula in L 0 , it is valid as a formula in the contextual PC language L 00 .
2 The above lemma essentially says that contextual PC is only a minor extension of PC. However, because of the greater similarity between the syntax of contextual PC and HiLog, it is instructive to investigate the relationship between the validity problems in these two logics. Suppose S and V is a set of parameters and variables, respectively. Let L H be a language of HiLog and L P be the sublanguage of contextual PC. In view of Lemma 3.1, it is tempting to think that every formula in L P is valid under the semantics of contextual PC if and only if it is valid under the semantics of HiLog. It turns out that the di erence between these semantics is more fundamental than in the case of the two avors of PC. Consider the following formula that is valid in HiLog:
(s(a) = r(b; c)) (s(a) $ r(b; c)) (1) It is easy to see that this formula is not valid in contextual PC, for the latter can assign relations to the parameters s and r that are not related in any way to the meaning assigned to the terms s(a) and r(b,c). This stands in sharp contrast with HiLog where truth value is assigned to intensions of atoms and according to the premise of (1) the terms s(a) and r(b; c) do have the same intension; hence, as atomic formulas, they also must have the same truth value.
Nevertheless, there is a correspondence between valid formulas of L P in HiLog and contextual PC in the important cases described in Theorem 3. if is satis ed by every free semantic structure then it is satis ed by all semantic structures. Theorem 3.1 Let, as before, L H be a language of HiLog and L P be the sublanguage of contextual PC (i.e., they share the same set S of parameters and the set V of variables). Let be a formula in L P . Here, j = cpc and j = hilog denote the logical implication relation with respect to the semantics of contextual PC and HiLog, respectively.
Proof: We prove both directions of (2) . The proof of the \if" direction of (2) is also a proof of (1).
To prove (2) , suppose that j = hilog holds. We show that j = cpc holds as well. Given a free semantic structure M P =< U; I F ; I P > for L P , we construct a semantic structure M H =< U; U true ; I; F > of L H as follows:
The domain U is the same as in M P ; I(s) = I The semantic structure M H is well-de ned since M P is free. It can be shown by induction that for any formula of L P and any variable assignment , M P j = if and only if M H j = . Therefore, if j = hilog , then is satis ed in every free semantic structure for L P . Since is freely-interpretable, it is satis ed in every semantic structure for L P , that is, j = cpc holds.
To prove the other direction of (2), let us assume that j = cpc holds. We need to show that j = hilog holds as well. Given a semantic structure M H =< U; U true ; I H ; F > for L H , we construct a semantic structure M P =< U; I F ; I P > for L P as follows: F (u 1 ; ; u k ) 2 U true . 4 Recall that the nonempty 0-ary relation interprets true propositions, while the empty relation interprets false propositions.
Again it can be shown by induction that for any formula of L P and any variable assignment , M P j = if and only if M H j = . Therefore if there exists some M H such that M H 6 j = , a semantic structure M P of L P can be constructed such that M P 6 j = , contrary to the assumption. Thus j = hilog holds.
2 Although the condition in Theorem 3.1 is not syntactic, it encompasses important classes of formulas. The following lemma shows that all equality-free formulas of predicate calculus are freely-interpretable. The other interesting class that is particularly important for logic programming consists of sets of de nite clauses with equality, but such that the equality is restricted to clause bodies. If G is a query and is a negative clause and P is a de nite logic program (possibly with equality in clause bodies) then evaluating the query amounts to showing that the set S = G P is unsatis able. Since Theorem 3.1 concerns validity (which is a contrapositive of unsatis ability), the class of formulas to consider in this theorem is f:S j S is a conjunction of Horn clauses free of equality in the headg.
Lemma 3.2 The following classes of contextual PC formulas are freely-interpretable:
1. Sets of equality-free sentences.
2. Formulas of the form :S, where S is a conjunction of Horn clauses free of \=" in clause-heads.
Proof: Consider a language L of contextual PC with a set of parameters S. Let be a formula in L that has one of the forms (1) or (2) above. Assume that for some semantic structure M =< U; I F ; I P > for L, M 6 j = . We show that there exists a free semantic structure M 0 =< U 0 ; I 0
The domain U 0 of M 0 is a free algebra built out of the elements of U and parameter symbols of L.
In other words, it is a minimal set satisfying the following conditions: (ii) For any term t of L, (t) = ( (t)) , where (t) is evaluated with respect to M while (t) is evaluated with respect to M 0 ;
(iii) The mapping 7 ?! is an epimorphism of variable assignments, i.e., for every variable assignment for M there is an assignment for M 0 such that = ;
(iv) For every equality-free formula , M 0 j = if and only if M j = .
Obviously, (1) follows from (iii) and (iv).
To show (2), let S be a conjunction of Horn clauses free of equality in clause heads. To show that :S is freely-interpretable, we prove that M 6 j = :S implies M 0 6 j = :S. The latter is the same as saying that M j = S implies M 0 j = S, and since S is a conjunction of clauses, we only need to establish this fact for the case of a single clause, r, that is, to show that M j = r implies M 0 j = r. Let It is interesting to note that although formulas of the form :S in the above lemma are freelyinterpretable, S itself may not be freely-interpretable. A simple example is the formula c a=b that is true in every free interpretation, but is not a valid formula in general.
Validity in Pure Predicate Calculus and HiLog
Since formulas in pure PC are also formulas in contextual PC, the results of the previous subsection hold for PC formulas as well. However, since the language of PC is a subset of contextual PC, we can obtain a stronger result than the specialization of Theorem 3.1 to PC.
De nition 3.3 Let P be a set of formulas in a PC or a contextual PC language L. Let denote the cardinality of the set of parameters of L. We say that P is cardinal with respect to L if the following property holds:
If P is true in every semantic structure M such that the cardinality of the domain of M is at least , then P is true in every semantic structure of L. 6 Lemma 3.3 Every freely-interpretable formula in contextual PC is cardinal. In particular, the formulas of the form described in Lemma 3.2 are cardinal.
Proof: For simplicity, we will prove the lemma for languages with nite sets of parameters. It su ces to show that every free semantic structure for a language L of contextual PC has an in nite domain.
Then if is freely-interpretable, suppose that it is true in every semantic structure of cardinality at least . Then it holds in every in nite and, in particular, every free semantic structure. Hence, since is freely-interpretable, it holds in every semantic structure.
Let M =< U; I F ; P > be a semantic structure for L and let s be a parameter in L. Such an s always exists since any language of CPC contains at least one parameter symbol (or else no well-formed 6 Implicit here is the assumption that whenever P is viewed as a PC formula then M is a PC structure and when P is viewed as a CPC formula then M is a CPC structure.
formulas can be constructed in this language). Let u 0 = I(s), u 1 = I (1) F (s)(u 0 ), u 2 = I (1) F (s)(u 1 ), and so on. Then, by the de nition of free structures, u 0 , u 1 , u 2 , and so on, are all distinct elements of U. 2
It is easy to see that the class of cardinal formulas strictly contains the class of freely-interpretable formulas. Lemma 3.3 provides for the inclusion. To show that this inclusion is strict, note that every propositional Horn rule (in PC or CPC) with a nontrivial equality in the body (e.g., p (a = b)) is cardinal but not freely-interpretable. Theorem 3.2 Let be a set of formulas in PC (and hence in HiLog). Then If is valid in PC then it is valid in HiLog.
If is cardinal then it is valid in HiLog if and only if it is valid in PC.
Before presenting the proof, we show that the second part of this theorem may not hold if is not cardinal or is a CPC but not a PC formula. Consider the following formula:
Clearly, this is a well-formed formula both in predicate calculus and in HiLog. It is also a valid HiLog formula because whenever the right side of the formula is true in a semantic structure M = < U; U true ; I; F >, the domain of this structure must be a singleton element. So, in M, q and r are mapped to the same element of U. Therefore, I(q(a)) = I(r(a)) and the left hand of the formula holds true. However, this formula is not valid in predicate calculus, since it is falsi ed by every semantic structure that has a one-element domain and interprets q by an empty relation while r by a nonempty one. One reason for this discrepancy between HiLog and predicate calculus is that the domains of quanti cation are di erent: in HiLog this domain contains r and q while in predicate calculus it does not. Therefore, predicate calculus has, in a sense, more interpretations than HiLog. Another reason is that truth of atomic formulas is de ned via intensions of these formulas in the domain of interpretation rather than via relations associated with predicate symbols.
The second part of Theorem 3.2 hinges in an essential way on the assumption that is a well-formed formula in predicate calculus. It is not true, for example, for formulas in contextual predicate calculus. Consider
This formula is not well-formed in PC (s and r play multiple roles here) but is well-formed in contextual PC. It is also a cardinal formula. It is easy to see that (2) is valid in HiLog but not in contextual PC (the latter is because semantic structures in contextual PC can assign di erent truth values to the atoms s(a) and r(b), even if the terms s(a) and r(b) have the same intension). Another observation is that (2) is cardinal but not freely-interpretable (it holds in every free structure because the premise is always false; however, as noted above, this formula is not valid in contextual PC).
Since the class of cardinal formulas in PC is strictly larger than the class of freely-interpretable formulas, Theorem 3.2 strengthens the result of Theorem 3.1 for the class of PC formulas. In fact, since cardinal PC formulas that are valid in HiLog are also valid in PC (Theorem 3.2), it follows that they are also freely interpretable (as are all valid formulas). Thus, Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 together imply that all cardinal yet non-freely-interpretable PC formulas are not valid in HiLog and in PC. (This means that these theorems identify the same class of valid PC formulas that are also valid in HiLog. However, Theorem 3.2 identi es a strictly larger class of non-valid PC formulas that are also non-valid in HiLog.) Proof of Theorem 3.2: Let L P be a language of PC with a set of parameters S and a set of variables V. Let The theorem immediately follows from the existence of the mappings with these two properties.
To construct HtoP, let M H =< U; U true ; I H ; F > be a semantic structure for L H . De ne the corresponding structure for L P as follows: HtoP(M H ) =< U; I P > has the same domain U as M H and I P is de ned below: To prove Prop-2 we de ne PtoH as follows. Let M P =< U; I P > be a semantic structure for L P , where the cardinality of U is at least as high as that of S. Because of the cardinality assumption, there is a mapping I H from S to U such that I H (c) = I P (c) for every symbol c in S that corresponds to a constant symbol c of L P ; and I H (f) 6 = I H (g) for every pair of distinct symbols f and g in S that correspond to function symbols (of arity > 0) or predicate symbols of L P .
We can now de ne PtoH(M P ) = M H =< U; U true ; I H ; F >, where the universe U of M H is the same as that of M P ;
the mapping I H from the parameters S of L H to U is the one de ned in the previous paragraph; and F is de ned thus:
{ If f 2 S corresponds to a k-ary function symbol of L P , where k 1, then (I H (f))
F (u 1 ; :::; u k ) = I P (f)(u 1 ; :::; u k ); for other arities r (r 6 = k), (I H (f)) (r) F is de ned arbitrarily. 7 It is important for the following construction that the HiLog interpreted parameters, such as \=", \true", and \false", are never used as function symbols in the PC language LP . { On other elements of U, F is de ned in an arbitrary way.
Since I H maps distinct function and predicate symbols of S into di erent elements of U, the mappings (I H (f)) (k) F and (I H (p)) (m) F are well-de ned.
Let be a variable assignment. Since L H and L P share the same set of variables and PtoH(M P )
shares the domain U with M P , is a variable assignment for both PtoH(M P ) and M P . Let H and P denote the extensions of to the set of all terms in L H and L P , respectively. The following properties can be proved by induction:
for any term t of L P in PC (which is also a term in L H ), H (t) = P (t); for any formula of L P in PC (which is also a formula in L H ), PtoH(M P ) j = hilog if and only if M P j = pc . Therefore, if is valid in HiLog, is valid in all semantic structures M P such that the cardinality of the domain of M P is at least that of S. If is also cardinal, this implies that is true in all semantic structures of predicate calculus. 2 
Encoding HiLog in Predicate Calculus
Since HiLog syntax is richer than that of predicate calculus, it may seem that HiLog is a more expressive logic. It turns out, however, that every HiLog formula can be encoded in predicate calculus, and therefore these two logics are equally expressive. It should be borne in mind though that our objective is not to devise a more expressive logic, but a logic whose syntax is more suitable for logic programming. In this respect, one can compare programming in HiLog vs. Prolog to programming in Prolog vs. Horn logic. It is well-known that Horn logic has the computational power of a Turing machine and, therefore, is su cient for all computational needs. However, programmer's convenience and the need to simplify problem speci cation calls for a richer syntax (negation, etc.) and this is why Prolog has the additional constructs it is notorious for. More discussion of this issue appears in Section 8.
The following encoding of HiLog in predicate calculus was suggested by James Wu 59] . Given a HiLog language L H with a set of variables V and parameters S, we de ne L encode P to be a language of predicate calculus with the set of variables V, constant symbols S, a unique predicate symbol \call", and for each n 1, an (n + 1)-ary function symbol apply n+1 . Given a HiLog formula , its encoding in predicate calculus, , is determined by the following recursive transformation rules. In these rules, encode a is a transformation that encodes HiLog terms that appear in contexts where they are interpreted as atomic formulas, and encode t encodes these terms in all other contexts. I P (c) = I H (c), for each c 2 S; I P (apply n+1 )(u; u 1 ; :::; u n ) = (u) (n) F (u 1 ; :::; u n ); I P (call) = U true ; The equality predicate, \=", has the standard interpretation in encode(M) (i.e., I P (=) def = f< u; u >j u 2 Ug).
The following result and its proof is due to James Wu 59] . The reason for the special treatment of \=" in the above de nitions will become apparent in Section 6.4. The above derivation holds for the equality predicate as well, because of the special interpretation assigned to \=" in Section 2.3.
We have thus proved the claim for atomic formulas. The rest of the proof is an easy induction on the structure of HiLog formulas. 
2
We conclude this section with a few remarks that shed some light on the relationship between HiLog and the second-order predicate calculus under the standard semantics 16]. Clearly, one should expect certain similarities because, for example, quanti cation over predicates and function symbols is allowed in both logics. On the other hand, the rst-order nature of HiLog semantics suggests that there must be very signi cant di erences.
For a similarity, it is easy to see that the language of HiLog is rich enough to express so called extensionality axioms. For instance, for arity 2 we can write 8P8Q(eq2(P; Q) $ 8X8Y(P(X; Y) $ Q(X; Y))) (3) According to (3), eq2(P; Q) is true if and only if P and Q are the same when viewed as binary predicates. This formula is identical to the extensionality axiom for binary predicates in second-order logic with the standard higher-order semantics. Thus, HiLog syntax appears to be rich enough to capture both the intensional and extensional aspects of functions and predicates.
However, a critical di erence between the semantics of HiLog and the standard semantics for secondorder logic is the domain of variables. In HiLog, variables range over a nonempty set of intensions. So in (3), P and Q range only over the intensions of binary relations, but there also may be relations without the corresponding intensions (the latter do not a ect the meaning of (3) in HiLog). In contrast, in the standard second-order semantics, the domain of predicate variables P and Q is the set of all binary relations over the individual domain. Therefore the extensionality axiom of standard secondorder logic talks about all possible relations. Although this distinction does not appear to have impact on the meaning of (3) in HiLog vs. second-order PC, it does make a di erence for the so called relation comprehension formulas 16]: 9P8X 1 8X n (P(X 1 ; X n ) $ ) (4) where is some formula in which P does not occur free and the only free variables are X 1 , ..., X n . It is well-known that these formulas are valid in the standard second-order predicate calculus. It turns out however, that they are not valid in HiLog. For instance, the formula:
is not valid in HiLog. One HiLog semantic structure which falsi es it is < fdg; fdg; I; F >, where I(p) = d, and d (k) F (d; ; d) = d for all k(k 1). Intuitively, this happens because domains of HiLog interpretations do not necessarily have intensions for complements of relations associated with predicate names. Whether this e ect is desirable or not depends on the intended meaning of quanti cation. In HiLog, the quanti cation is over intensions, and since there is no name for :p in T , (5) is not valid.
Applications of HiLog
As explained earlier, although the semantics of HiLog is rst-order, a term can be viewed as an individual, a function, or a predicate, depending on the context in which it appears. When functions or predicates are treated as objects, they are manipulated as terms through their intensions; when applied to arguments they are evaluated as functions or relations through their extensions. By distinguishing between intensional and extensional aspects of functions and predicates, HiLog preserves the advantages of higher-order logic and avoids the computational di culties with extensions introduced by higher-order semantics. In this section we review a subset of HiLog that is suitable for logic programming and then show its uses in higher-order logic programming, de nite clause grammars in natural language processing, and other areas.
Logic Programming in HiLog
For practical applications, we consider logic programming instead of general theorem proving with HiLog. By a logic program we mean a nite set of formulas of the form For de nite logic programs, standard logic programming techniques 54, 4, 35] can be used to de ne the declarative and procedural semantics. The only di erence is the form of atomic formulas and uni cation (uni cation is discussed in Section 6.3). For instance, for de nite HiLog programs, the model intersection property holds and, therefore, each such program has a unique minimal (with respect to set inclusion) Herbrand model. The T P operator is also de ned as usual: If H is a Herbrand interpretation and P is a de nite program, T P (H) is the set of all literals that are heads of ground clauses of P whose body is satis ed in H. The standard results about xpoint also hold. These facts are easy to verify directly or with the use of Theorem 3.3.
For logic programs with negation, semantics is de ned by choosing one or several of the minimal Herbrand models. For instance, the de nitions of well founded semantics 50, 52, 55, 56] and stable model semantics 20] are independent of the notions of atomic formulas and Herbrand bases and thus the same de nitions can be applied to HiLog. Some results on negation in HiLog can be found in 53].
Higher-Order and Modular Logic Programming
Higher-order constructs have been found very useful in programming practice. An example is the maplist of Lisp. It can be de ned in HiLog either as a higher-order predicate
maplist(F, ], ]). maplist(F, XjR], YjZ]) F(X, Y), maplist(F, R, Z). or as a generic predicate maplist(F)( ], ]). maplist(F)( XjR], YjZ]) F(X, Y), maplist(F)(R, Z).
The latter is possible since HiLog allows complex terms such as maplist(F) to appear as predicates. The example in Section 2.1 shows the usefulness of generic view de nitions, such as closure, in databases. Generic transitive closure can also be de ned in Prolog:
R, X, Y], call(C). closure(R, X, Y) C =.. R, X, Z], call(C), closure(R, Z, Y).
However, this is obviously inelegant compared to HiLog (see Section 2.1), since this involves both constructing a term out of a list and re ecting this term into an atomic formula using \call". The point of this example is that the lack of theoretical foundations for higher-order constructs in Prolog resulted in an obscure syntax, which partially explains why Prolog programs involving those constructs are notoriously hard to understand. It turns out that since variables may be instantiated to HiLog terms which in turn have propositional meaning, there is no need for the infamous \call" predicate that is built into Prolog. The latter is naturally de ned in HiLog as call(X) X.
which has the intended semantics. Higher-order constructs have been also used in database languages, such as COL 1] and LDL 5, 46], for modeling complex objects containing sets. The original semantics of these languages, as described in 1, 5, 46], is higher-order, which leads to certain semantic and computational di culties. In Section 5 we propose an alternative semantics for COL and LDL using HiLog, and argue that the latter is computationally more tractable and practically more convenient.
Modular logic programming is another application where higher-order logic can be employed. In 7, 8], a theory of modules is developed based upon standard second-order logic. The semantics of a module is a second-order relation over rst-order predicates interpreted as rst-order relations. The relational view of modules is a natural extension of logic programming. However, standard second-order logic is not recursively axiomatizable, and practical usage of modules does not need the full power of second-order predicate calculus.
HiLog can be used to provide a simple alternative semantics for modular logic programming which, unlike 7, 8] , has a sound and complete proof theory. Consider the following program fragment (which is well-formed both in predicate calculus and in HiLog):
trans(X, Y) edge(X, Y). trans(X, Y) edge(X, Z), trans(Z, Y).
To turn it into a module de nition, we need to determine its interface with other modules. This program fragment contains a de nition for trans in terms of edge. Suppose that predicate trans is exported and predicate edge is a parameter which can be instantiated to any binary predicate of the user's choice. To obtain a module de nition, we replace each non-global predicate symbol by a predicate variable of the same arity, where di erent predicate names are replaced by distinct variables. This is done to ensure the local scope of those symbols, since only variables have local scopes in logic. In the concrete syntax g.
The head of a module de nition de nes module interface. It consists of exported predicate parameters (like Out) and input predicate parameters (like In); the body of a module de nition is the \implementation" of the module. Individual variables are still universally quanti ed with respect to each clause in the body (unless they are also module interface parameters, which is discussed in 7, 8]). Non-interface predicate variables in the body, if any, represent private predicates that are not to be seen outside the module. The quanti cation of predicate variables is such that all input predicate parameters are universally quanti ed and all other predicates (private and exported ones) are existentially quanti ed inside the scope of the universal quanti cation of the input predicate variables. It is precisely due to this existential quanti cation of predicate variables why the local data in the module is shielded from outside.
The above module de nition not only de nes rst-order predicates in the body of the module, but also the second-order predicate corresponding to the module name, namely mod trans. The above module de nition can be given meaning via the following formula:
8In9Out ( Instead of interpreting the above formula under the standard second-order logic, we can interpret it as a formula in HiLog, getting a more tractable semantics for modules. Under the HiLog interpretation, mod trans is simply a rst-order parameter symbol, just like link. In an implementation, existential variables can be eliminated by Skolemization, which preserves unsatis ability in refutational theorem proving (e.g. SLD-resolution).
After a module is de ned, it can be used just as any other predicate, except that it may also take predicates as arguments. Consider the query
link(a, b). link(b, d). link(d, e). link(a, c).
?-mod trans(link, Closure), Closure(a, X).
where Closure is a predicate variable and X is an individual variable.
Under the second-order semantics, Closure will be bound to a relation corresponding to the transitive closure of the link predicate. Therefore, X can be bound to any node reachable from a and the answer to this query will be the set of all such nodes.
Under the HiLog semantics, Closure will be bound to an intension, c, in the domain of quanti cation, rather than to a relation. Nevertheless, the binary relation associated to c by HiLog semantics (that is, (c (2) F ) ?1 (U true )) will be the same as under the second-order semantics|the transitive closure of link. Therefore, once again, X can be bound to any node reachable from a and the set of answers to the above query will be the same as before.
The HiLog semantics for modules yields the same result as 7] in most cases, but disagrees with 7] in marginal situations when the inherent di erence between the intensional treatment of predicates in HiLog and the extensional treatment in 7, 8] becomes essential. For instance, when two di erent predicates p and q that are extensionally equivalent are to be uni ed, they are uni able in the standard second-order semantics, but not in HiLog.
Another di erence is that, HiLog modules have features not found in 7]. For instance, modules in 7], being second-order predicates, cannot be imported into other modules, since second-order predicates cannot be arguments to other second-order predicates. Therefore manipulating modules requires more than just a second-order PC. In contrast, there are no such di culties in HiLog, and module names, being merely rst-order terms in HiLog, can be passed to other modules as parameters.
De nite Clause Grammars in HiLog
De nite clause grammars (DCGs), developed for processing natural language 47], extend the contextfree grammars by adding arguments for checking the agreement among linguistic structures, and by allowing arbitrary computation in the body of a rule. They can be translated into Prolog by adding an additional pair of arguments for representing the string of words being parsed. As an example, consider the following DCG rules: Unfortunately, the above translation into Prolog no longer works, since Prolog does not allow variable predicates. Indeed, blindly following this recipe, we would get
which is a HiLog but not a Prolog rule. To overcome this problem, we could try to turn X(L0, L) into something like NewX =.. X, L0, L], call(NewX). However, even this patch does not work all the time. Because of the syntactic limitations of Prolog, special mechanisms for translating such grammars into Prolog are needed, and papers have been written on that subject (e.g., 2]). In contrast, as we have just seen, translation of generic grammars into HiLog is immediate, and does not require any special machinery: we simply go on (as suggested by the standard algorithm) and replace each nonterminal, N, by a HiLog atom N(L1, L2). Regardless of whether N is a predicate symbol, a function symbol, a variable, or a term, HiLog accommodates them all, due to the richness of its syntax. As a matter of fact, even the original DCG-to-Prolog translation could be made more natural in HiLog. DCG nonterminals with parameters are readily transformed into parameterized predicates in HiLog. For example, the rst DCG rule above: 
Query Evaluator
Consider relational expressions composed from, say, binary relations connected by the relational operators minus, union, and the like. Suppose that the parser has already produced a parse tree (parsing is easy using Horn clauses) of the expression in the form of a term, say, minus(union(p; q); inter(q; r)), or similar. As the next step, we would like to write an evaluator for such expressions, which in HiLog looks as follows: The rst observation about this Prolog program is that it is clumsy compared to its HiLog counterpart (notice that the arguments X, Y in tr are essential for the program to run correctly). Second, the last rule is intended to capture the situation where P is instantiated to a predicate symbol. However, this restriction is only implicit in the built-in predicate \=..", which will give an error if P is not a predicate symbol. One way to get around this is to list all the facts such as tr( p, X, Y, p(X,Y) ) (for each predicate symbol) in advance. However, this is particularly inconvenient in the database environment when the user may create or delete new relations, since the above program would have to be updated each time.
The ease of writing the above program in HiLog stems from the ability to represent intermediate results of query evaluation in a natural way. For instance, minus(p; q) can be viewed as the name of an intermediate relation for the result of subtracting Q from P. However, it should be clear that in order to take full advantage of HiLog, arities of all relations must be known at compile time, since we must know how many variables should appear in various places in rules. Therefore, rules for the relational operators that do not change the arities of relations (like the ones above) look particularly attractive in HiLog. On the other hand, operators such as join or Cartesian product require a heavier machinery, such as functor and arg. Still, this program would be much more elegant in HiLog than in Prolog.
Type Checking
Recently, Thom Fruehwirth has pointed out to us that the monomorphic type checking system of 17] can be naturally extended to a polymorphic type checking system for HiLog 18], while expressing general polymorphism in predicate calculus is usually quite cumbersome. The use of HiLog as a language for type speci cation is further explored in 9].
HiLog as a Database Programming Language
In this section, we show that HiLog provides an alternative ( rst-order) semantics to some of the wellknown database languages with higher-order semantics, thereby eliminating some of their problems. Speci cally, we will focus on COL 1] and LDL 5, 46] . After that we will discuss various applications of HiLog to object-oriented databases.
COL 1] is a logic-based language for complex objects. One notable feature of COL is that, in addition to nite set construction, it also provides so called \data functions". These functions may take sets and individuals as arguments, and return sets as results. Data functions can be de ned by either facts or rules. For example, some of the operations over sets can be de ned as data functions as follows 1]: X 2 intersection(S1, S2) X 2 S1, X 2 S2. X 2 union(S1, S2) X 2 S1. X 2 union(S1, S2) X 2 S2. X 2 di erence(S1, S2) X 2 S1, not (X 2 S2).
Notice that variables S1, S2 range over a domain of sets, and thus, according to our classi cation, the semantics of COL is higher-order. This higher-orderness presents certain semantic problems for logic programs in COL. Consider the following example adapted from 1]:
person(peter, fbridgeg). person(thom, fchess,tennisg).
person(thom, hobby(peter)).
This program is unstrati ed in COL, since hobby and person mutually depend on each other and, therefore, the following perfectly legal queries that request all Tom's hobbies and inquire whether Tom plays bridge, will be rejected:
?-X 2 hobby(thom). ?-person(thom, f chess, tennis g).
To cope with this problem, 1] proposes to use an analogue of the notion of local strati cation adapted from logic programming 49]. For simplicity, we restrict our attention to COL programs without tuple constructs and such that their nite set-constructs have no variables. Thus, the forms such as f a, b g are allowed, but f a, b, X g are not. Later we will show how to extend our results to the general case. Now, the restricted COL programs can be transformed into HiLog programs as follows:
1. Replace every nite set construction, fa 1 ; :::; a n g, that appears in the COL program by a new HiLog logical symbol, sym, and add the following facts to the program: sym(a 1 ), ..., sym(a n ). Identical nite set constructions must be consistently replaced by the same symbol. For instance, person(thom, fchess, tennisg) will be replaced by person(thom, hobby thom), and the following pair of facts: hobby thom(chess). hobby thom (tennis) .
2. Replace COL-formulas of the form X 2 f(:::) by HiLog formulas f(...)(X).
Then the above program is transformed into the following well-formed HiLog program:
person(peter, hobby peter).
person(thom, hobby thom). person(thom, hobby(peter)). hobby peter(bridge). hobby thom(chess). hobby thom(tennis). hobby(X)(Y) person(X,Z), Z(Y).
and the corresponding queries become ?-hobby(thom)(X). ?-person(thom, hobby thom).
These queries yield the same results as their counterparts in COL (provided that the above unstrati ed COL program is given the intended semantics). For another example, consider the COL query ?-person(thom, fchessg).
to the above database (with the last rule deleted, to ensure strati cation). This query fails because fchessg and fchess, tennisg are two di erent sets. The corresponding HiLog query is ?-person(thom, another hobby thom), another hobby thom(chess).
(and the database must contain another hobby thom(chess)). This query also fails since, similarly to COL, another hobby thom represents a di erent set of hobbies than hobby thom. However, the query ?-person(thom, hobby thom), hobby thom(chess).
succeeds, since it is asking whether Thom plays chess, while the previous query inquired whether f chess g is one of Thom's hobby sets. Notice that the semantics of COL treats Thom as if he had di erent sets of hobbies in di erent \frames of mind," and we have been able to capture this aspect of COL pretty adequately. In contrast, in COL there is no easy way (without introducing additional rules) to ask whether Thom plays chess, which demonstrates greater exibility of HiLog compared to COL. There is, however, a signi cant di erence between the semantics of COL and that of HiLog. For instance, suppose that instead of the previous clause for hobby, the hobby-function is de ned as follows: chess 2 hobby(peter). bridge 2 hobby(peter).
Then the query ?-person(thom, fbridge, chessg).
returns the answer \true" in COL, while the corresponding query ?-person(thom, yet another hobby thom).
in HiLog returns \false".
This di erence stems from the fact that in COL, the domain of set variables consists of sets (extensions), while the domain of variables in HiLog is a set of objects (intensions). Thus, in COL, person(thom, hobby(peter)) is evaluated to person(thom, fbridge, chess g), which allows the above COL query to succeed. Our contention is, however, that the separation of intensional and extensional aspects in HiLog makes it more exible: The extensional semantics of COL can be captured in HiLog rather easily, by de ning extensional equality of intensions. For instance, the following formula 8P8Q ( eq1(P, Q) $ 8 X ( P(X) $ Q(X) )) says that P and Q always represent the same unary relations extensionally; P and Q may be intensionally di erent though, and nothing is said about, say, binary relations represented by P and Q. However, the above axiom does not quite capture our intentions. What we really need is the extensional equality of predicates with respect to the intended semantics of logic programs. For the purposes of this section, we adopt the perfect model semantics of locally strati ed programs, which can be de ned for HiLog along the lines of 49]. 8 The intended extensional equality can now be captured via the following rules with negation: eq1(P, Q) subset(P, Q), subset(Q, P). subset(P, Q) not not subset(P, Q). not subset(P, Q) P(X), not Q(X). Now, if desirable, HiLog can simulate the extensional semantics of COL for the above query as follows:
?-person(thom, X), eq1(X, yet another hobby thom).
Recall that according to the rst transformation rule, the database would contain the facts yet another hobby thom(bridge). yet another hobby thom(chess). Since person(thom, hobby(peter)) is one of the original facts in the database, the above HiLog query succeeds with X = hobby(peter). So, to simulate the semantics of COL more closely (but still not exactly), we must add one more transformation rule, which must be applied after the rst two:
3. Replace every literal p(:::; t; :::) in the body of a rule (including the queries), where t is either a term involving a data function or a constant that replaces a nite set construction (introduced by the rst transformation rule), by the following conjunction: p(:::; X; :::); eq1(X; t). For instance, in the above, the query ?-person(thom, yet another hobby thom). was replaced by ?-person(thom, X), eq1(X, yet another hobby thom).
We complete our discussion of COL by showing how to extend the translation described above to the general case. Capturing the tuple construct is easy. We just reserve a parameter symbol, say tuple, for the speci c purpose of representing COL tuples; e.g., a,b] and c,d,e] become tuple(a,b) and tuple(c,d,e), respectively. For the set construct, we reserve a special symbol, setc. Now, every nite set construct, e.g., f a, b, X, d g, should be replaced by a HiLog term, setc(a,b,X,d), and the appropriate facts must be added to the database. In our example these would be
The transformation rule 2 requires no change; in rule 3 we only need to replace the phrase \constant replacing a nite set construct" by the phrase \set term replacing nite set construct." LDL 5, 46] is another in uential logic database language with a higher-order semantics. In addition to nite set construction, it provides the, so called, grouping construct, which is even more general than data functions of COL. Again, LDL programs can be translated into HiLog with an alternative, rst-order, semantics. Similarly to COL, certain programs that are not well-formed in LDL can be given satisfactory semantics by such a translation.
Finite set constructs of LDL are translated into HiLog the same way as in the case of COL. For the grouping construct (which in LDL can occur only in rule heads), we can do the following:
Replace every LDL rule of the form p(X; <Ỹ >) body, whereX,Ỹ are vectors of variables, by the pair of HiLog rules: p(X; sym(X)) body. sym(X)(Ỹ) body. where sym is a new HiLog symbol.
Consider, the following LDL program:
Intuitively, this says that p is true of all elements of the domain and also of some other element of the domain that, in some sense, is the set of all domain elements. However, in LDL, sets are members of the domain on a par with individuals. As a result, the above program becomes tantamount to the famous set theoretic paradox, since p has to contain the set of all sets as an element. The corresponding HiLog program is p(X). p(a) p(X). a(X) p(X).
It de nes a predicate which is true of every element in the domain. It also de nes a as a symbol that represents the entire domain, whenever this symbol appears as a constant within an atomic formula. This corresponds to the aforementioned intuitive meaning of the above LDL program, which favors the HiLog semantics over LDL. This also shows that, in general, the translation of LDL into HiLog does not capture all the power of the grouping construct 9 . However, in most \normal" cases of grouping in LDL, the corresponding HiLog program gives the same result. For instance, consider the set-intersection example from 5]:
intersect(S,T,<X>) member(X, S), member(X, T).
The corresponding HiLog program is: intersect(S,T,inter(S,T)) member(X, S), member(X, T). inter(S,T)(X) member(X, S), member(X, T).
which gives the same result. Note, however, that in HiLog set intersection has a more concise and elegant representation:
inter(S,T)(X) S(X), T(X).
We thus see that HiLog provides an alternative (we believe, computationally more attractive) semantics to LDL. Unlike COL, where it seems that HiLog can closely mimic the semantics, there is a more dramatic di erence between HiLog and LDL because the latter is so expressive that even logical paradoxes can be represented without much di culty. Such paradoxes are not representable in HiLog since the latter has a rst-order semantics, and the translation of paradoxical LDL rules yields rather benign HiLog programs.
To conclude this comparison, we mention that the alternative semantics for sets in LDL and COL described above is in the same spirit as the semantics described in C-logic 12] and O-logic 28], although the latter are rst-order (object-oriented) languages. It appears thus, that higher-orderness of the syntax of HiLog is inessential in order to simulate sets. However, it is essential for other applications described earlier. It seems like an interesting observation, therefore, that changing the philosophy behind logical languages can|in some cases|eliminate the need for higher-orderness either in semantics, or in syntax, or in both.
Another promising application of HiLog in the database eld is its use as an implementation vehicle for object-oriented languages recently proposed in 12, 28, 24, 25]. C-logic 12] is the simplest of the three; it supports complex objects, object ids, sets, and classes. For instance, the \hobby" example discussed earlier can be represented in C-logic as follows: yielding the same results as those produced by the corresponding HiLog representation. C-logic admits a natural translation into predicate calculus by viewing each class symbol (e.g., person) as a unary predicate, and each set-valued attribute (e.g., hobby) as a binary predicate 12]. Ologic 28] extends C-logic by allowing single-valued attributes and by introducing a lattice structure over object ids, which helps to localize the e ect of data inconsistency. Translation of O-logic into predicate calculus is just a shade more complex; it additionally requires axiomatization of functional attributes and data inconsistency. F-logic 24, 25] takes object-oriented logics to a new dimension by introducing higher-orderness with a rst-order semantics, in the same spirit as HiLog. Although it can be encoded in predicate calculus, this encoding is neither natural nor suggestive of an e cient implementation. However, an extension of the algorithm from 12] would translate F-logic into HiLog quite naturally.
This opens up a possibility of using HiLog for fast prototyping of object-oriented logic languages. Compared to the direct implementation of object-oriented databases, the advantage of HiLog as an implementation platform is that it can be relatively easily implemented using one of the already available technologies developed for Prolog 58, 43] or LDL.
Proof Theory of HiLog
Because of the encoding in Section 3, one can use a proof theory for predicate calculus in order to prove theorems for HiLog. However, a proof theory stated in terms of this encoding is neither intuitive, nor suggestive of a possible e cient implementation. Furthermore extensions of HiLog will be developed in order to support more features such as lambda abstractions and dynamic updates, and these extensions may not have a direct translation into predicate calculus. A direct proof theory of HiLog is therefore important in its own right and may provide additional insights for further investigations of HiLog extensions.
In this section, we present a resolution-based proof theory given directly in terms of HiLog. The following issues are examined: Skolem and Herbrand theorem, uni cation, and resolution. The discussion follows the development of resolution-based proof theory for predicate calculus 6].
Skolemization
Given a sentence in HiLog, it can be transformed into an equivalent formula 0 in prenex normal form Q 1 X 1 : : :Q n X n , where Q i (1 i n) is either 8 or 9, is a quanti er-free formula in conjunctive normal form, and X i (1 i n) are all variables occurring in . The rules for this transformation are identical to those for the ordinary predicate calculus, since the usual De Morgan's laws apply due to the fact that the de nition of logical entailment relation j = in Section 2.3 is identical to that in predicate calculus (except for the notion of atomic formulas).
Because of the similarities between HiLog and predicate calculus, one might think that by eliminating all existential quanti ers in 0 using the usual Skolemization process in predicate calculus, we will obtain a Skolem standard form of , which is unsatis able if and only if so is . However, unsatis ability of does not entail unsatis ability of . 10 To see this, consider 8X9Yp(X; Y)^8F9Z:p(Z; F(Z)):
Converting into prenex normal form and then Skolemizing X and Y in the ordinary manner (using the new function symbols g and h), yields 8X8F( p(X; g(X))^:p(h(F); F(h(F))) ):
It is easy to see that is satis able in HiLog (but not in the second-order predicate calculus!), which can be veri ed directly by constructing a semantic structure M =< U; U true ; I; F > in which for every u 2 U the function u (1) F is di erent from all the functions : U 7 ?! U de ned by the expression 8X9Yp(X; Y).
In contrast, is unsatis able, since
is an instance of .
Intuitively, the reason why the usual Skolemization process misbehaves is that in HiLog it is not enough to choose a new symbol to represent a new Skolem function: such a symbol also needs to be assigned a new intension. Indeed, we have to assign an appropriate Skolem function as an extension of the symbol introduced by Skolemization. In predicate calculus, extensions are assigned directly to function symbols and, therefore, by choosing a new function symbol we can construct a semantic structure for any desired Skolem function. In contrast, HiLog assigns extensions to intensions of function symbols and simply choosing a new symbol is no longer enough: we should be able to assign a new intension to such a symbol, which|as the above example shows|is not always possible. In fact, as we shall see, choosing a new symbol is not that crucial for Skolemization in HiLog.
One way to overcome this problem is to modify Skolemization so as to avoid the need to assign new intensions to Skolem functions. Instead of introducing a new Skolem symbol, we will use an unused arity of one of the old symbols, patching the extra argument positions. For the formula above, we could use, say, symbol p with the arity 3 for Y and with the arity 4 for Z, obtaining the following Skolemized form:
8X p(X; p(X; p; p))^8F:p(p(F; p; p; p); F(p(F; p; p; p))):
Notice how the symbol p was used to ll in the argument positions of the terms p(X; p; p) and p(F; p; p; p).
Let L be a language of HiLog that contains at least one parameter symbol. Given a formula 0 of L in prenex normal form Q 1 X 1 : : :Q n X n , where Q i (1 i n) is either 8 or 9, is a quanti er-free formula in conjunctive normal form and X i (1 i n) are all variables occurring in . Suppose that Q i is the leftmost existential quanti er in . Let k be the maximum arity that has been used in , which exists since is nite. We obtain a new formula 1 by eliminating the leftmost existential quanti er Q i in and replacing every occurrence of X i in with p(X 1 ; ; X i?1 ; p; :::; p) which has max(k + 1; i ?1) arguments. Assume that there are m existential quanti ers in 0 . We repeat this process for every j (j < m) and nally derive a formula m without any existential quanti ers. The formula m is called the Skolem standard form of 0 .
Lemma 6.1 A sentence is unsatis able if and only if its Skolem standard form is unsatis able. 10 We are grateful to one of the referees for suggesting this example and pointing out a mistake in an earlier draft of this paper.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that is already in prenex normal form. Let 0 be and m be the number of existential quanti ers in . Then is m , where each j (1 j m) is obtained from j?1 by the above Skolemization process. We show that j is unsatis able if and only if j?1 is unsatis able.
Let j?1 be in a prenex normal form 8X 1 :::8X i?1 9X i Q i+1 X i+1 :::Q n X n X 1 ; :::; X n ], where X i is the leftmost existential variable, X 1 ; :::; X n ] is a formula in conjunctive form and X 1 ; :::; X n are all the variables occurring in it. Suppose that k is the maximum arity that has been used in j?1 , and f is the parameter symbol used in the Skolemization of X i . Then j is of the form 8X 1 :::8X i?1 Q i+1 X i+1 :::Q n X n X 1 ; :::; X i?1 ; f(X 1 ; :::; X i?1 ; f; :::; f); X i+1 ; :::; X n ];
where f(X 1 ; :::; X i?1 ; f; :::; f) has max(k + 1; i ? 1) arguments.
Suppose that j?1 is true in a semantic structure M =< U; U true ; I; F > but j is unsatis able.
Then for every x 1 ; :::; x i?1 2 U, there exists x i 2 U such that M j = Q i+1 X i+1 :::Q n X n X 1 ; :::; X n ];
for every variable assignment that maps X 1 , ... , X i to x 1 , ... , x i , respectively. We construct a new semantic structure M 0 =< U; U true ; I; F 0 >, where F 0 is exactly the same as F except that for every x 1 ; :::; x i?1 2 U, I(f) k+1 F 0 (x 1 ; :::; x i?1 ; I(f); :::; I(f)) = x i , where x i is chosen as explained in (6) above.
Since the arity k + 1 is not used in j?1 , the function I(f) k+1 F is not used to determine whether (6) holds. This, together with the fact that the domains of M and M' coincide, yields M 0 j = j . Since was chosen arbitrarily for X 1 , ..., X i?1 and X i does not occur in j , it follows that M 0 j = j , contrary to the assumption that j is unsatis able. Therefore j?1 must be unsatis able. For the reverse direction, assume (in the above notation) that j is true in a semantic structure M, but j?1 is unsatis able. Following the de nition, it can be veri ed that j?1 is true in M|a contradiction. Thus j must be unsatis able. 2 Note that Skolemization in HiLog, as presented above, works for nite sets of formulas only. A solution that also works for in nite sets is proposed in 9]. The idea is to introduce sorted symbols into HiLog and then use classical Skolemization, which does not rely on the existence of unused arities. This, however, requires an extension to HiLog and will not be discussed here (see 9]).
Herbrand's Theorem
Once Skolemized, we can restrict our attention to universal formulas, i.e., to formulas in prenex normal form whose pre x contains universal quanti cation only. Furthermore, transforming such formulas into conjunctive normal form, yields HiLog formulas in the clausal form. As usual, we can then drop quantication altogether with the understanding that clauses are implicitly universally quanti ed. To avoid possible misunderstanding, recall that in the presence of equality we only consider those semantic structures that assign the intended meaning to the equality predicate (see Section 2.3). To emphasize this fact, we will call such semantic structures E-structures. We can then talk about Eunsatis able and E-valid formulas, i.e., formulas that are false (resp. true) in all E-structures. Lemma De nition 6.2 A substitution is a nite set of the form ft 1 =X 1 ; :::; t n =X n g, where X 1 ; :::; X n are distinct variables, and every term t i is di erent from X i , where 1 i n.
De nition 6.3 A uni er for a set of HiLog terms fe 1 ; : : :; e k g is a substitution such that e 1 = : : : = e k . A set fe 1 ; : : :; e k g is uni able if it has a uni er.
De nition 6.4 A uni er for a set fe 1 ; : : :; e k g of expressions is most general if and only if for each uni er for this set there is a substitution such that = .
Following 39], we can derive an e cient uni cation algorithm by solving equations. An equation is of the form t 1 = t 2 , where t 1 ; t 2 are terms. An equation set (possibly empty) is solved if it has the form fX 1 = t 1 ; : : :; X n = t n g and the X i 's are distinct variables which do not occur in any t j (1 j n).
Notice that a nite equation set in solved form can be naturally viewed as a substitution.
A solution of the equation set ft 1 = s 1 ; : : :; t n = s n g is a substitution such that t i s i (1 i n). An equation set is solvable if it has a solution. A solution for an equation set E is most general if and only if for each solution of E there is a substitution such that = .
Given a nite equation set, the uni cation algorithm non-deterministically chooses an equation from the equation set to which it applies one of the following transformations according to the form of the selected equation: 21] where it is shown that uni cation becomes undecidable once variables are allowed in places where normally only function symbols are permitted to appear. There is no contradiction, however, with our result, for the following reasons. Informally, for a su ciently rich logic with a higherorder syntax to have a decidable uni cation problem, two conditions are su cient. First, the semantics of the logic should be rst-order. That is, predicate and function variables should not range over relations or functions. Instead, they must range over intensions or names of predicates and functions. Second, the logic should not have an undecidable built-in equality theory over names of predicates and functions. HiLog satis es both conditions by separating intensions from extensions (thereby avoiding extensional uni cation) and by embodying only a trivial equality theory of intensions. In contrast, Goldfarb 21] essentially works with second-order -terms that embody an undecidable equality theory, and this is what makes uni cation undecidable in this case. It is important to realize that since L t] in the above de nition may be the same as t, in HiLog one needs to paramodulate not only on the terms occurring strictly inside atomic formulas, as is the case in predicate calculus, but also on atomic formulas themselves. This is an interesting distinction with respect to PC which stems from the fact that HiLog is a higher-order language in which atomic formulas are not distinguished from terms. An example when atomic formulas must be paramodulated upon is presented below.
De nition 6.7 Let Proof: Under the encoding of Section 3, given a set of HiLog clauses S, any application of the factorization, paramodulation, or the resolution rules to clauses in S corresponds to an application of the respective rule to encode(S), and vice versa. 12 Thus, it follows from the analogous result in predicate calculus 6] that the combination of resolution, factorization, and paramodulation is a complete set of inference rules for refuting E-unsatis able sets of HiLog clauses. Note that, unlike 6], we do not include functional re exivity axioms f(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) = f(x 1 ; : : :; x n ) in the formulation of Theorem 6.3. This is possible due to a result in 48] that shows that these axioms are not needed for completeness of paramodulation. 13 We also note that if S contains no equality atoms then \E-unsatis ability" can be replaced by \unsatis ability" and the axiom X = X would not be needed. is valid in HiLog. Therefore its negation should be E-unsatis able. The negation of the above formula can be transformed into the following three clauses: (1) s(a) = r(b; c). (2) s(a) _ r(b; c). (3) :s(a) _ :r(b; c). 12 It is noted that the special treatment of \=" in the de nition of encode in Section 3.3 was essential to ensure the above correspondence in case of the paramodulation rule. 13 This result was pointed out to us by Leo Bachmair By paramodulation, we can derive from (2) and (1) (4) r(b; c).
and from (3) and (1) 
:r(b; c).
Then by resolution we can derive the empty clause from (4) and (5), which completes the refutation.
HiLog Implementation Issues
A straightforward implementation of a Horn clause logic programming language based on HiLog is possible using the encoding of HiLog into PC, described in Section 3. Since this encoding preserves Horn clauses, we could simply use a standard Prolog compiler to execute the result of such encoding. While this is theoretically sound and may even be practical for prototype programs, for large programs there are some e ciency issues that deserve further consideration. These have to do with fast access to the appropriate clauses at predicate invocation, and e cient representation of data structures. Also, built-in nonlogical predicates, dynamic changes to the database, and control constructs, such as the \cut", lead to new issues in the HiLog framework. This clause also happens to be a predicate logic Horn clause. Its encoding in predicate logic is:
call(apply(p,X,Y)) call(apply(q,X,Z)), call(apply(p,Z,Y)).
With every clause encoded in this way, each HiLog program, no matter how large, de nes exactly one Prolog predicate, call/1. For Prolog-like e ciency, each predicate invocation must locate quickly the clauses whose heads might possibly unify. In Prolog systems, this is achieved rst by branching directly to clauses with the same predicate, and then using indexing, normally on the main functor symbol of the rst argument, to further re ne the search. Notice that for the encoding of a HiLog program, these two ways of re ning the search are not very e ective; Prolog sees only one predicate, call/1, and the main functors of all those heads are apply/n. Thus the only ltering would come from the arity of \apply". One approach would be to use partial evaluation techniques to optimize the direct translation 22]. A problem with this approach is how to treat nonlogical constructs, such as \assert". Another way to improve clause access would be to improve the indexing strategy used by the underlying Prolog system, perhaps as proposed in 51]. An alternative is to constrain the HiLog programs in such a way as to allow simple compile-time optimizations. One way we are exploring is to restrict the clauses to those whose heads have a nonvariable symbol in the leftmost position, that is, clauses whose heads are rigid terms. In this case, all rigid calls in the bodies of clauses can be compiled to branch directly to the appropriate clauses.
Another issue is the representation of HiLog terms. In Prolog, complex terms are normally represented as linked record structures. An n-ary term is represented using n + 1 consecutive words, the rst word indicates the functor symbol and the arity, n, and the following n words represent the n arguments. To represent a HiLog term, another arity is required. The most natural way uses n + 2 words: one for the arity, one for (a pointer to) the functor term, and n for the argument terms. While this might seem somewhat wasteful of space, using an entire word for a relatively small arity, we suspect that this will turn out to be the most e cient representation. It is actually a regularization of Prolog's representation and will make for slightly simpler traversal algorithms.
A realistic logic programming system must support built-ins, which have nonlogical behavior. A decision must be made as to whether these built-ins can be accessed by a most general call. For example, should the query X(Y) be able to call the read/1 predicate? The most reasonable choice seems to be to exclude this possibility. A desired separation of built-in predicates from the rest can be achieved by introducing sorts into HiLog 9] , that is, by splitting S and V into disjoint subsets and then proceeding to de ne HiLog terms of di erent sorts. In this way, \normal" variables will not be instantiatable by the symbols that represent built-in predicates. If the user wishes to manipulate such symbols, he would have to use variables of an appropriate sort explicitly.
The issue of the \cut" is also complicated. In Prolog a cut eliminates the alternative clauses remaining for the current predicate. Since in HiLog di erent calls can access various subsets of clauses, the notion of \predicate" is not so well-de ned. These and other issues are explored in more detail in 19].
8 Conclusion: Do We Need Yet Another Logic?
Whenever a new logic is proposed, the question is (and should be) raised as to whether yet another logic is needed. Why not just stay with the logics we know and understand? This is an especially cogent point when the new logic has a simple and reasonably direct translation into the grand-daddy of all logics, rst-order predicate calculus, as in our case HiLog does. We believe, however, that in the case of HiLog there are at least three reasons why we should seriously entertain the idea of this new logic as a basis for logic programming.
Firstly, programming in HiLog makes more logic programs logical. We all admonish Prolog programmers to make their programs as pure as possible and to eschew the evils of Prolog's nonlogical constructs. In Prolog the intermixing of predicate and function symbols, in particular in the predicate, call/1, is nonlogical, whereas in HiLog it is completely logical and is a rst-class citizen. So in HiLog programmers need not avoid using call/1, and so have more exibility in their task of writing pure logic programs.
Secondly, even though one might say that HiLog is simply a syntactic variant of Prolog, syntax is important when one is doing meta-programming. Since in meta-programming the syntax determines the data structures to be manipulated, a simpler syntax means that meta-programs can be much simpler. We saw this in the example of translating DCGs to HiLog, to the extent that a meta-program already written (the DCG translator) would automatically work in a more complicated situation, and so did not need to be changed at all.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, a di erent logic encourages in the programmer a di erent way of thinking. Certainly the translation of any HiLog program could be programmed directly in Prolog, but would it be? The DCG example, we believe, shows not. Not only is there an issue of e ciency in that the translation might not execute as e ciently as the programmer desires, but also that the programmer would not even think of that Prolog program. HiLog encourages the programmer to think about and use parameterized predicates; Prolog does not. HiLog programmers would be more likely than Prolog programmers to modularize their programs along the lines suggested in Section 4.2 above. The language in uences the way programmers think, and the programs they write.
Finally, we would like to point out that HiLog is not the only logic which can be encoded in predicate calculus. The classic rst-order modal logics provide a rich source of examples when a di erent syntax (motivated by a di erent philosophy of logic) inspired important and useful studies both in Logic and Arti cial Intelligence.
In summary, we believe that HiLog o ers signi cant advantages over Prolog, and deserves serious consideration as the basis for a new logic programming language.
